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Contribution: Roundtable symposium on Anthony Smith’s work. 
 
Jonathan Hearn 
 
Power, Culture, Identity, and the work of Anthony Smith 
 
 
It is an honour to participate in a commemoration of Anthony Smith’s work.  I didn’t 
know Anthony well, but always found him very friendly and collegial in our 
interactions around ASEN.  He made a huge and lasting contribution to the study of 
nationalism, through his writing, teaching, and guidance and leadership in regard to 
ASEN and the journal Nations and Nationalism.  Whether one agrees or disagrees 
with his main arguments, one must recognise his fundamental influence on the field 
of nationalism studies.  
 
Anthony was not one to generate highly formal theories, with social ‘mechanisms’ 
and causal hierarchies.  There were few if any diagrams full of causal arrows.  What 
he specialised in was conceptualisation, the formulation of ‘ideal types’, illustrated 
and fleshed out through his vast comparative knowledge of historical cases.  In this 
regard, even though he didn’t present himself as ‘Weberian’, that is the broad 
theoretical approach with which one might most associate him.  Because of this he 
has left his mark on our conceptual vocabulary: ‘ethnies’ (aristocratic and demotic) 
(1989), mythomoteurs (1986, adapted from John Armstrong, 1982), ‘golden ages’ 
(1986), ‘chosen peoples’ (2003a), and so on.  Each of these identify and abstract 
recurrent themes in the study of nationalism that call out for explanation.  Such 
typological thinking is a necessary step in theorising, reducing the welter of fact to 
key patterns and relationships to be explained (Lenski 1994). 
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Anthony’s other main contribution in my view was to constantly direct our attention 
to the problem of historical continuity, through what came to be known as the 
‘ethnosymbolic approach’ (2004).  This argued for the enduring cultural continuities 
between modern nations and the ethnic formations that preceded them, and that 
this was basic to understanding the modern phenomenon.  I myself come closer to 
the kind of ‘modernist’ position that Anthony was often critical of, being more 
concerned with what has changed with the formation of modernity, and how the 
modern nation reflects those changes (of which, more in a moment).  But I 
appreciate the way he challenged a kind of ‘lazy modernism’ in which the ‘modern’ 
and the ‘premodern’ (or ‘traditional’) are defined as logical opposites—all rupture 
and no continuity (cf. Grosby 2018).  Clearly it is more complicated than that, and 
however transformed, much of the modern world has deep historical roots.  The 
theoretical problem here was perhaps best summed up once by the anthropologist 
Julian Steward, who spoke of the form-function concept, that is, that the same social 
functions can be served by different social forms, and the same social form can serve 
different social functions (Steward 1972: 91).  This makes the tracking of continuity 
over time very tricky. 
 
One example of this problem can be found in the histories of European aristocracies, 
which span the ‘traditional/modern’ divide.  Simple talk of the crisis and decline of 
aristocracy in the face of modernity fails to capture the continuous transformation of 
these groups from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.  It is a story of new 
functions and retooling as these evolved from feudal warrior castes, to 
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administrators of expanding absolutist bureaucracies, and a leadership class for 
newly professionalised and technologized armies, all the while with numbers being 
replenished by non-noble rising classes.  Noble social and political authority 
changed, but persisted throughout the modern period, only going into steep decline 
in the 20th century, with the organisational rise of the modern constitutional state 
and the modern corporation (Asch 2003; Dewald 1996). 
 
I would make two further points in regard to Anthony’s attention to the historical 
dimension of nationalism.  First, today some might argue that questions of the 
history and origins of nationalism are old hat and theoretically threadbare1.  I myself 
have suggested that the ‘primordialist vs. modernist’ debates have become 
somewhat exhausted, positions having been argued to a standstill (Hearn 2006: 7-8).   
One might just say ‘we live in a world of nations—who cares how they got here—
let’s just try to understand how they work now’.  But we can’t escape the past that 
easily.  How modern nations got here bears upon what they are.  The nations we find 
ourselves in today are not timeless systems, they are the latest effects of long, 
complex and shifting chains of causation.  More methodologically, whether one sees 
historical rupture or historical continuity in the emergence of modern nations, 
depends on how you define the object and what questions you are asking about it.  
Some questions point towards long causal chains into the past, others less so. 
 
The second point is that, unlike some, I’ve never seen Anthony’s work as 
exemplifying a kind of ‘cultural essentialism’ in contrast to ‘social constructionism’ 
(see the exchange between Umut Ozkirimli (2003) and Anthony Smith (2003b) in 
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Nations and Nationalism).  I would say ‘we are all social constructionists now’, 
including Anthony, in the sense that it is standard to see social life as assembled out 
of institutions and conventions that are artificial human creations, not just given by 
nature.  He clearly appreciated that the ideas and identities that constitute 
nationalisms are socially constructed, made of pliable symbolic materials.  That is 
what ethnosymbolism asserts.  The point for Anthony was that these social 
constructions are deeply embedded in human experience, and remarkably durable in 
many cases.  
 
Like Anthony, part of my work has been concerned with questions of national 
identity (Hearn 2001; Smith 1991).  However, I am aware that my thinking here has 
developed somewhat in resistance to Anthony’s, so exploring that tension may be 
instructive.  Anthony saw strong patterns of national identity, of social investment in 
the reality and authenticity of the national group, as a factor contributing to the 
longevity and survival of nations.   In the ethnosymbolic approach, the strength of 
symbols, myths and memories explains the persistence of nations.   As he put it in his 
late work on the sacred religious sources of national identity: 
 
… the more of the different kinds of sacred foundations a given nation 
possesses, and the richer and more varied their cultural resources, the more 
persistent and adaptable to change is the corresponding national identity 
likely to be.  The members of those present day nations that can boast a rich 
heritage of such cultural resources in relation to community, territory, 
history, and destiny and are more likely to retain their sense of national 
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identity and ensure the survival of their national community, despite the 
increasing pressures for radical change and cosmopolitan assimilation 
(2003a: 260). 
 
Conversely he says, those with weaker ‘sacred foundations’ and ‘cultural resources’ 
are more likely to lose cultural focus and succumb to such changes (Ibid.).  This is a 
characteristic assertion in Anthony’s work.  In this view, strong cultural identity 
generates power—the power to endure.  No doubt there is some truth to this, but 
I’ve always felt it sort of begs the question, where does strong cultural identity come 
from in the first place, other than just ‘the past’?  There is a strong, quasi-
functionalist2 claim in Anthony’s work that cultural identities serve a fundamental 
ontological need for ‘authenticity’ and orientation in the world, and that national 
identity is the premier form of cultural identity in the current age.  It is this claim that 
has caused many to see essentialist and primordial tendencies in his thinking.   
 
As I’ve suggested, I tend to approach questions of identity from the other end.  Not 
‘how does identity create power’, but ‘how does power create identity’?  This 
happens in at least two ways (Hearn 2012: Ch 10).  First, in the way that forms of 
social organisation bestow powers on their members through enhanced collective 
capacity to achieve ends.  Members identify most strongly with their kin group when 
it is achieving dominance over others, with the corporations that employ them when 
they are expanding and gaining reputation, with their nation-states when they are 
growing GDP and winning wars.   But when any form of social organisation reaches 
its limits, loses standing in relation to its comparators, and starts to bear down more 
 6 
heavily on its members in response, that is when identification with the organisation 
either goes soft, as people question their allegiances, or goes extreme, if people can 
see no alternatives. 
 
The second way that power creates identity is in opposition.  When the people in 
one organisation or group hold power over others, those so dominated will tend to 
construct identities as counterfoils to that domination, to define their identities 
against their oppressors.  And this of course is a central motif in nationalism studies, 
in the appeals to local, authentic folk cultures that resist the powers of colonising 
civilisations.  But here the very intensity of identification is understood as an effect 
of the power relationship and how it is met, not a pre-existing resource that then 
determines survival. 
 
Of course both of these forms of power, the collective power of the organised group, 
and the oppositional powers between such groups, are constantly interacting, 
generating, consolidating, and also disassembling social identities.  This is not to 
argue that identities are therefore secondary and insignificant.  Just as a strong, 
seemingly coherent ideology can enhance the power of a group or organisation, the 
same is true of identity.  I do not share the extreme scepticism of some in our field 
about the usefulness of the concept of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; 
Malešević 2011).  It seems to me that social identity is a real phenomenon, an 
observable framework through which people act, and are acted upon.  But for me 
the most interesting questions are about how identities evolve in response to 
dynamics of power. 
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I confessed earlier to being a kind of modernist, and the way I think about identity 
bears upon how I conceptualise modern nationalism.  Where some ‘modernists’ 
tend to think of nations and nationalisms as effects of the rise of the modern 
economy (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992) or the modern state (Breuilly 1993; Tilly 
1975) I am inclined to see them as overarching responses to the ‘problem of rule’: 
how is authority to be achieved in societies in which strong kinship bonds and 
hereditary right to rule (backed up by force) have weakened?  The classic answer of 
the eighteenth century rebels and revolutionaries was to revalorise democracy and 
claim that the authority to rule rested not in aristocracies, but in a mysterious body 
called ‘the people’ (no longer a dangerous mob).  Modern nationalism is a perennial 
need to answer, and re-answer the question, who are these people?  What are they 
like?  What do they want?    The modern problem of rule, of centralised authority 
serving a self-governing mass society, creates the need to fashion and refashion 
answers to this question (Bendix 1978; Poggi 1978). 
 
To return to Anthony’s work, although I disagree with his recurring argument for the 
historical continuity of ethnic and national identity, I recognise the detail and scope 
of his analysis of the various ways that ‘the peoples’ get constructed: through 
narratives of ‘chosenness’, myths and rituals of community, visions of golden ages in 
the collective past, attributions of sacredness to identity itself.  These types are 
analytically significant because they can be shown to recur over many cases, raising 
questions about underlying continuities of symbolic form.   But the deeper root of 
our disagreement here is not really one of matters of fact and evidence, it is one of 
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conceptualisation.  For Anthony nations are, by definition, continuous, self-same 
historical entities.  For myself, as just stated, they are by definition a shifting and 
unstable response to a situation, the modern problem of rule.  On some level, we 
are just not talking about the same thing, because we conceptualise it differently. 
 
Anthony was part of a now passing generation of nationalism scholars who 
generated a remarkable set of influential books and articles in the field from the 
1980s—Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson, Connor.  That fertile set of ideas was then 
set in intellectual motion by historical events: the collapse of the USSR and its 
aftermath, 9/11 and ‘war on terror’, and more generally the diverse impacts of 
‘globalisation’ on nations and nation-states.  In recent years I have wondered if that 
impulse, that wave of focused intellectual energy, was starting to dissipate.  Are we 
running out of things to say about nationalism?  But recent political events in my 
original (US) and adoptive (UK) homelands have given me a grim conviction that the 
study of nationalism is alive and kicking, or at least should be. 
 
The rise of a new populist politics in the UK and the US, manifest in the events of 
Brexit and the election and presidency of Donald Trump, are the most prominent 
examples of a larger global trend of wide and deep disenchantment with established 
political orders, which seem not to be adequately answering the question: who are 
we, and how do we want to rule ourselves?  We are seeing deep social and cultural 
divides within countries concerning how the question should be answered.  And I am 
sure some of the new answers, on both sides of these divides, will involve the 
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perennial symbolic forms Anthony paid such close attention to—chosenness, 
collective sacrifice, lost golden ages, and so on.   
 
Just as Brexit and Trump reveal already established crises of national identity, 
particularly in advanced capitalist economies under complex pressures from 
globalisation and neoliberal ideology, a host of other looming problems and issues 
are likely to put further strain on these and other nation-states.  Heightened 
capitalist competition around the globe, intensified struggles over key resources 
(water, food, energy), ecological impacts of global warming, geopolitical struggles for 
influence in the Middle East and claims on the South China Sea, the possible 
dissolution of the European Union, continuing flows of migrants and refugees, and 
their reception in lands of refuge.  The list could go on.  The point is that all these 
pressures are likely to intensify both the claims of states on the national identities of 
their members, to bolster national power, and the conflicts between nations that 
deepen oppositional identities in resistance to external power. 
 
Perhaps the ‘primordialist versus modernist’ debates can now be left to Smith and 
Gellner to carry on in some afterlife, some Warwick Debate in the sky.  The forces 
just enumerated ‘reassure’ me that there are new debates about the nature and fate 
of nations and nationalism waiting just over the horizon.  While the historical 
triggers of these debates change, the pertinence of nationalism persists.  The current 
global situation is not one I would have chosen, but the study of nationalism within it 
strikes me as being as urgent as ever.  Anthony’s legacy is one of the pillars on which 
future study will be built.   
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1 This point has been made to me in personal communication by both Jon Fox and Marco 
Antonsich. 
 
2 An attribution I’m sure he would object to, see Smith 1973! 
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